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Securities R ~ ~ U ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ - D E F I N I T I O N  OF A SECURITY-A SHARE OF 
A NONPROFIT COOPERATIVE HOUSING CORPORATION IS NOT A 
s ~ c u R ~ ~ ~ - U n i t e d  Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 
2051 (1975). 
Co-op City, a massive cooperative housing development in 
New York City, is reputed to be the largest such project in the 
United States.' Its construction was initiated and sponsored by 
United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit corporation con- 
sisting of labor unions, civic groups, and other housing coopera- 
tives. The purpose of Co-op City is to provide "decent" housing 
for persons in middle- and lower-income brackets; hence, pro- 
spective residents must meet certain financial eligibility require- 
m e n t ~ . ~  Prospective residents purchase shares of common stock 
in the cooperative corporation organized by UHF.3 The literature 
initially promoting that stock, distributed in 1965, estimated that 
the average monthly carrying charge (rent) would be $23.02 per 
room. Because of increased construction costs, the monthly carry- 
ing charge was periodically increased; by 1973-74, it was $35.27. 
Outraged by the increased cost of their apartments, 57 resi- 
dents, on behalf of all other apartment owners, sued UHF. Their 
principal claim was that the information bulletin failed to dis- 
close several material facts and falsely represented that the cor- 
poration would bear the cost of inflation. Specifically, the plain- 
tiffs charged that the defendants had sold them securities and 
were in violation of the antifraud provisions of the Federal Securi- 
ties Acts of 1933 and 1934 (Securities Acts).* The district court, 
1. The district court described the magnitude of the project in these terms: "[T'jhe 
project . . . houses some 45,000 people. The complex is located on a 200-acre site, includes 
more than 30 high-rise buildings and more than 230 townhouses, which in total provide 
about 15,400 apartment units ranging from three to seven rooms." Forman v. Community 
Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
2. The maximum annual earnings of a family of three or less eligible for a four-room 
apartment was initially $6,624; for a family of four or more, $7,728. Brief for Respondents 
at 6, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975). It  should also be 
noted that from 1965 to 1973 the income eligibility requirements were increased to almost 
double the initial requirements. Id. "[A111 of this is of little solace to the elderly and the 
handicapped, or anyone on a fixed or sluggish income, or indeed, anyone who arranged 
his affairs based on a belief that the earlier Co-op City estimates would remain unaffected 
by changes in the economy." Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 
1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
3. To secure the right to occupy his apartment, the prospective resident had to 
complete a Subscription Agreement and Apartment Application form. In so doing, he had 
to agree to subscribe to 18 shares of Riverbay common stock (Riverbay Corporation is a 
mutual company organized by UHF) for each room in his apartment. Each share had a 
par value of $25.00. 366 F. Supp. a t  1122. 
4, The plaintiffs also asserted violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. $9 1983, 
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in granting defendants' motion to dismiss, held that a share of a 
"state-financed and supervised, nonprofit cooperative housing 
corporation" is not a security under the federal securities laws 
and hence, the federal courts had no juri~diction.~ The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding 
that the definitional sections of the Securities Acts literally apply 
since the shares were specifically denominated "stock," and al- 
ternatively, that  the transaction was an investment contract 
within the meaning of the Securities Acts? The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that shares in a nonprofit housing cooperative 
corporation are not securities as defined by the Securities Acts. 
A. Cooperative Housing 
1. The  history and status of  cooperative housing 
Housing cooperatives date back to the late 19th century7 but 
did not become a popular form of housing until the 1920 '~ .~  Before 
the 1950's, apartment cooperatives were designed principally for 
upper-income  person^.^ By the end of World War 11, however, a 
new trend in cooperative housing emerged as cities tried to cope 
with the housing shortage caused by increased population. Coop- 
erative housing units were constructed for middle- and lower- 
income groups, the groups most seriously affected by the postwar 
housing shortage.1° This trend was accelerated when Congress 
enacted legislation providing for public financing and mortgage 
insurance to private developers of apartments and cooperative 
housing corporations.ll The New York State Legislature re- 
sponded to the postwar housing shortage in that state by enacting 
1988 (1971). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the civil 
rights claim should be dismissed since it was "vague and conclusory." 95 S. Ct. a t  2064 
n.24. 
5. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. a t  1120-21. 
6. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252-53 (2d Cir. 1974). 
7. Goldstein, Introduction to Cooperatives, in COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS, 4 
REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE TRANSCRIPT SERIES 79, 81 (J. McCord ed. 1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Goldstein]. One of the earliest cases discussing cooperatives (though 
not using that term) was Barrington Apt. Ass'n v. Watson, 45 Sup. Ct. 545 (N.Y. 1886), 
enjoining a tenant-shareholder from subletting his apartment to someone "objectional" 
to the other members of the association. 
8. Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U.L. REV. 465 
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. 
9. See Goldstein, supra note 7, a t  82-85. 
10. See Miller, supra note 8, a t  466. 
11. Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1407, 1413-14 (1948). 
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the Limited Profit Housing Companies Law, popularly known as 
the Mitchell-Lama Act. l2 The Mitchell-Lama Act provided that 
qualified housing corporations could borrow on mortgage from the 
state or municipality up to 90 percent of the cost of the project 
at  an interest rate similar to that paid by the state on its own 
obligations. l3 
In addition to providing quality housing for lower- and 
middle-income families, there are a number of reasons why coop- 
erative housing is an attractive alternative to conventional home 
ownership or apartment renting.14 For example, members in a 
housing cooperative are able to share the burden of maintenance 
costs.15 Also, cooperative apartment housing today may be less 
expensive than renting.l"urther, the tenant-shareholder of a 
cooperative corporation receives an income tax deduction for his 
share of the mortgage interest payments and property tax if his 
cooperative meets the requirements of section 216 of the Internal 
Revenue Code." 
Despite the many advantages of cooperative housing, how- 
ever, tenant -shareholders face some possible problems. Since 
they do not hold fee simple title to their apartment, refinancing 
is not available if the shareholder has need of cash.18 The possibil- 
ity also exists that the corporation may not be able to meet its 
12. Mitchell, Forward to N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. at IX (McKinney 1962). 
13. Id. a t  X. 
14. See Smadbeck, Basic Features of the Cooperative Trend, in COOPERATIVES AND 
CONDOMINIUMS, 4 REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE TRANSCRIPT SERIES 88,89 (J. McCord ed. 
1969). 
15. See generally Miller, supra note 8. 
16. Note Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1948). "In addi- 
tion, [tenant-shareholders] have learned that elimination of the landlord's profit and 
some of his expenses may make a co-operative apartment more economical than ordinary 
renting." Id. (citation omitted). 
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Q 216 allows a deduction for the tenant-shareholder's 
contribution to the property tax, mortgage interest, and business depreciation of the 
cooperative housing corporation. 
The tax advantages are best seen by comparing the tax positions of the 
tenant in a conventional apartment house with those of the . . . tenant- 
stockholders in a cooperative corporation. The former does not have an income 
tax deduction for any part of his rental unless the premises are used for business 
purposes or for the production of income. . . . The tenant-stockholder will be 
entitled to an income tax deduction for a proportionate share of the real estate 
taxes included in the so-called "Maintenance" charge for a cooperative . . . . 
Kaster, Tax Aspects of Cooperatives and Condominiums, in COOPERATIVES AND 
CONDOMINIUMS, 4 REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE TRANSCRIPT SERIES 30,31 (J. McCord ed. 
1969). 
18. NELSON & WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 776 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NELSON & WHITMAN]. 
852 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
mortgage obligation. If the corporation were forced into default, 
the interests of the shareholders could be endangered.lg This 
threat has been largely mitigated, however, by the mortgage in- 
surance provisions of the National Housing Acts.20 
2. The legal form of housing cooperatives 
In general, a housing cooperative is "a corporate or business 
trust entity holding title to the premises and granting rights of 
occupancy to particular apartments by means of proprietary 
leases or similar  arrangement^."^' A cooperative housing develop- 
ment may take one of three legal forms:22 (1) co-ownership,23 (2) 
the trust form,24 or (3) the corporate form.25 The corporate form 
is by far the most convenient and common26 and is also the form 
that  gives rise to securities law  question^.^' Co-op City is a 
corporate-type cooperative. 
19. Id. 
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1970). 
21. 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND P R A ~ I C E  § 1.01[2] (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as ROHAN & RESKIN]. 
The form of lease used by the corporation for this purpose is called a 'pro- 
prietary lease.' A proprietary lease, is, in fact, a lease and not any other variety 
of 'ownership document.' It is similar to an ordinary apartment lease, except 
that it is reasonable and except for certain provisions peculiar to the tenant- 
shareholder relationship with the cooperative-landlord corporation. 
See Goldstein, supra note 7, a t  81. 
22. 2 ROHAN & RESKIN § 2.01[1] (1974); Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of 
Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305 (1961). 
23. The co-ownership form can also be broken down into three forms: (1) joint ten- 
ancy, where all the tenants own the entire premises as co-owners in fee simple. To create 
a cooperative of this type, there must be a conveyance to all the grantees simultaneously 
by a single instrument. This is highly impractical for a large cooperative; (2) tenancy in 
common, where the occupants own the entire premises as tenants in common but each 
has exclusive rights to a specific apartment; (3) the California tenancy-in-common cooper- 
ative, where the purchaser receives an undivided fractional interest in the land and build- 
ing. 2 ROHAN & RESKIN § 2.01[2] (1974). 
24. In the trust form, a business trust is organized in which the trustees issue either 
beneficial interest certificates to individual owners or the whole beneficial interest to the 
project's organizer who then assigns the certificates to the purchasers. The purchasers are 
also assigned the exclusive right to occupy an individual apartment. 2 ROHAN & RESKIN 9
2.01[3] (1974); See Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of Cooperative Housing, 12 LAW & 
CONTEMP. ROB. 126, 127 (1947). 
25. In this form, a corporation is organized by the promoter who acquires the build- 
ings and the land; shares of the corporation are then sold to the prospective occupant who 
receives a proprietary lease for a specific apartment. 2 ROHAN & RESKIN § 2.01[4] (1974); 
Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 305, 310-11 (1961). 
26. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 
CALIF. L. REV. 299 (1962). 
27. See Miller, supra note 8. 
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B. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: What is a Security? 
Both the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) contain sections that pur- 
port to define a security.2n In spite of the comprehensive nature 
of the definitions, however, it has been noted that "[tlhe defini- 
tion of the term 'security' as used in the principal federal securi- 
ties laws, is for the most part one of the best kept secrets in recent 
legal history."2g Commentators and the courts, however, generally 
agree that a flexible definition of a "security" is essential to meet 
the purposes of the Securities Acts. Congress in drafting the legis- 
lation appears to have intended such f l e~ ib i l i ty ;~~  the courts' in- 
terpretations of the legislation have certainly promoted it.31 
The 
28. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(l) (1970), provides: 
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit- 
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or 
other mineral rights or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim, certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 8 78(c)(10) (1970), provides: 
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any 
oil, gas or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preor- 
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any 
instrument commonly known as a security . . . . 
The definitional section of the 1934 Act relies heavily on the 1933 Act definition, and 
while the two are substantially the same, there are some differences. L. Loss, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 478-79 (1951). See also 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 
10b-5 § 4.6 (312), a t  82.2 (1974). These differences, however, are immaterial in the context 
of this case. 95 S. Ct. a t  2058 & n.11. " The Securities Act of 1933 . . . contains a definition 
of security virtually identical to that contained in the 1934 Act. Consequently, we are 
aided in our task by our prior decisions which have considered the meaning of security 
under the 1933 Act." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967) (footnotes omit- 
ted). 
29. Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining 
Federal Securities, 25 HAST. L.J. 219 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hannan & Thomas]. 
30. H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933), states that "[plaragraph (1) 
defines the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within 
that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within 
the ordinary concept of a security." See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 182 (1934), where the authors observe that "[tlhe Act defines a 
'security' in very broad terms. . . . The sweeping character of the definition was 
presumably dictated by a desire to prevent the use of allied forms for purposes of evasion." 
31. The Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 
(1963) states: "Congress intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to be construed 
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1 .  Investment contracts 
One of the terms used in the Securities Acts to define a 
"security" is investment contract.32 While the term is undefined 
in the statute, it had a long history of interpretation and use in 
state securities regulatioP before it was adopted in the Federal 
Securities Acts. The United States Supreme Court first dealt 
with an  investment contract in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing 
C ~ r p . ~ ~  In Joiner, the Court found an investment contract in the 
sale of assignments of oil leases to specific parcels of land. Each 
purchaser was induced to buy his assignment by the prospect of 
profits from an oil well to be drilled on his The Court 
declined to give a specific d e f i n i t i ~ n ~ ~  of an investment contract 
but stated that "the test . . . is what character the instrument 
is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distri- 
bution, and the economic inducements held out to the pros- 
pect. "37 
Three years later, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. ,38 the Court 
crystallized the definition of investment contract: 
[A]n investment contract, for purposes of the Securities Act 
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person in- 
vests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, 
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are 
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the 
physical assets employed in the en t e r~ r i s e .~~  
The Howey test thus includes four factors: (1) a person invests 
his money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) is led to expect 
profits (4) solely40 from the efforts of the promoter or a third 
like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." 
32. Statutes cited in note 28 supra. " '[anvestment contract' . . . has become the 
'catch-all that isn't otherwise caught' . . . ." 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL 
CORPORATE LAW § 2.02, a t  2-7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as H. BLOOMENTHAL]. 
33. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 314 & n.34 (1951); see, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire 
& Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). 
34. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
35. Id. a t  345-46. 
36. Id. a t  355. ("In the present case we do nothing to the words of the Act; we merely 
accept them. ") 
37. Id. a t  352-53. 
38. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
39. Id. a t  298-99. 
40. While the test states that profits must come solely from the efforts of others, the 
courts have construed the term solely to mean "primarily," in an effort to avoid a too 
restrictive definition of a "security." SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 
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party.41 The Supreme Court, recognizing that a scheme could 
possibly be devised that technically evades the test, later added 
that "in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'secu- 
rity' in the [I9341 Act, form should be disregarded for substance 
and the emphasis should be placed on economic reality."42 
Since the Howey decision, courts have found the existence of 
of investment contracts in a variety of contexts: deferred annuity 
contracts,43 fur-bearing animal breeding contracts,44 mineral pro- 
duction contracts," distributorship  contract^,^^ scotch whiskey 
warehouse receipts,47 and pyramid selling schemes.48 
2. Form u. substance 
In instances where the courts have found a security by disre- 
garding form for substance, they have generally been expanding 
the reach of securities l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  This substance-over-form 
analysis may also be used, however, to exclude certain transac- 
tions from the scope of securities regulation. For example, some 
schemes or instruments may have the form of a security but, 
when judged in the light of "economic reality,"50 cannot be 
deemed securities in s~bs tance .~ '  At least three of the circuits, the 
Third, Fifth, and Seventh, have opted for substance over form.52 
476,481-82 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U S .  821 (1973); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary 
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1974). 
41. Courts usually think of Howey as a three-pronged test, combining the third and 
fourth factors noted here. Commentators, however, usually think of it in terms of these 
four factors. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 32, a t  4 2.04; Hannan & Thomas, supra note 
29, a t  225. 
42. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). In Tcherepnin, the particular 
type of security in question was an investment contract. In fact, the only type of security 
the Supreme Court has concerned itself with to date has been an investment contract. 
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29, a t  219. 
43. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U S .  202 (1967). 
44. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1967). 
45. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 442 F.2d 1124, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970). 
46. Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1265-68 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
47. SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386,1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), 
aff'd, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974). 
48. SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 1973). 
49. See C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th 
Cir. 1975). 
50. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U S .  332, 336 (1967). 
51. Bank notes have the form of a security but generally not the substance. See 
Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973). 
52. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(a commercial note is not a security); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 
1974) (a one-year promissory note and a deed of trust issued for a bank loan allegedly 
needed to pay the corporate obligation of a closely held corporation are not securities); 
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On the other hand, the Second Circuit has adopted a literal 
approach, selecting form over substance.53 The validity of the 
literal approach was one of the central issues in the instant case. 
The respondents advanced two arguments in support of their 
contention that their shares in the housing cooperative are securi- 
ties.54 First, under a literal application of the Securities Acts' 
definitional sections, the shares are securities because they are 
specifically denominated Second, the shares of com- 
mon stock are "investment contracts" or at least "instruments 
commonly known as securities. "56 
The Court rejected both arguments. It first noted that acts 
of Congress must be construed within the framework of their 
intent and not be bound by a literal construction and application. 
The Court also noted that it is not likely that persons intending 
to acquire a residential apartment will think they are investing 
in securities "simply because the transaction is evidenced by 
something called a share of stock."57 The Court rejected the Sec- 
ond Circuit's and respondents' reliance on the language in Joiner 
that "instruments may be included within [the definition of a 
security], as [a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to 
the name or descriptio~."~~ The Court termed the language dic- 
tum and reasoned that the Court in Joiner had not intended to 
establish an "inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic 
realities underlying a t ransact i~n."~~ 
In rejecting respondents' second argument that the shares 
are "investment contracts" or "instruments commonly known as 
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d Cir. 1973) (promissory notes are not 
securities where the notes are not procured for speculation or investment and where there 
is no indication that the franchisor was soliciting venture capital). 
53. 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 (2d Cir. 1974). 
54. In order to establish jurisdiction, the plaintiffs needed to establish that the shares 
they purchased were securities. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1970). 
55. See note 28 supra. 
56. Id. 
57. 95 S. Ct. at 2060. The court also noted that these shares lacked all the characteris- 
tics that in commerce fall within the ordinary concept of a security. Among these are: (1) 
the holder has a right to receive dividends, (2) the shares are negotiable, (3) they can be 
pledged or hypothecated, (4) they confer voting rights in proportion to the number of 
shares owned, and, (5) they can appreciate in value. The Court also stated that "substance 
governs rather than form . . . just as some things which look like real estate are securities, 
some things which look like securities are real estate." Id. at 2059 n.13 (citing 1 L. Loss, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 493 (2d ed. 1961)). 
58. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). 
59. 95 S. Ct. at 2059. See 53 TEXAS L. REV. 623, 629 (1975). 
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securities,"" the Court again examined "the substance-the eco- 
nomic realities of the transaction-rather than the names . . . 
employed by the parties? The Court restated the Howey test, 
noting that there must be "the presence of an investment in a 
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits 
to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of 
Respondents, anticipating this last requirement, had argued 
that they were led to expect profits from their investment in three 
ways. First, the promotional literature emphasized that they were 
to receive an income tax deduction for the portion of their 
monthly rental charge applied to the mortgage interest.'j3 Second, 
their monthly rental charges were to be substantially lower than 
the going rates for comparable housing. Third, net income de- 
rived from the leasing of commercial facilities, parking places, 
and laundry facilities was to be applied to reduce the residents' 
monthly rental charges. In responding to these contentions, the 
Court limited the definition of profits to mean "either capital 
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial invest- 
ment . . . or . . . earnings resulting from the use of the investors' 
funds."" Applying this narrow definition of profit, the Court sum- 
marily dismissed the first two contentions but felt the third 
contention-the possibility of profits from the leasing of 
facilities-constituted a plausible argument. While this rental 
income is the type of profit ordinarily expected by an investor, the 
Court reasoned that in the present case the profit expectation was 
too "speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction 
within the Securities 
60. The Court noted that there is "no distinction, for present purposes, between an 
'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a security.' " 95 S. Ct. at  
2060. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (emphasis added). In this formulation of the Howey test, the Court removed 
the troublesome "solely" from the test, stating that there must be an expectation of profits 
derived from the efforts of others; no mention was made that the profits derive solely from 
the efforts of others. 
63. See note 17 supra. 
64. 95 S. Ct. a t  2060. 
65. Id. at 2062. 
The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents' position on this issue. 
Ordinarily, the brief of the affected administrative agency would be entitled to great 
weight. But in the instant case, the Court felt that the SEC's brief was in contradiction 
to its previously stated position that the only real estate transactions considered by them 
to be investments are those "offered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to 
the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts [of others]." Id. at 2063 n.24. 
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973). 
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Three justices dissented, arguing that the respondents were 
induced to purchase Co-op City shares by the prospect of eco- 
nomic benefits that would "come solely from the efforts of oth- 
e r ~ . " ~ ~  The dissenters also argued that all the other ingredients of 
the Howey test were met and that the Court erred in its conclu- 
sion that shares of stock are not necessarily securities merely 
because they are so defined in the Securities Acts. 
By refusing to declare that shares of stock in a nonprofit 
cooperative housing corporation are securities, the Court clarified 
important aspects of securities regulation by (1) restricting the 
scope of the Howey test and (2) resolving a division among circuit 
courts concerning the use of the literal approach in defining se- 
curities. The Court also drew a much needed line of demarcation 
between securities law and real property law and at the same time 
avoided creating an unequal status before the law between two 
similar types of real estate development: cooperatives and con- 
dominiums. 
A. Limiting the Howey Test 
On five occasions prior to its decision in the present case, the 
Supreme Court has considered the definition of a security in the 
context of an investment contra~t.~' In each of the five cases the 
Court has looked through the form of the transaction to its sub- 
stance and found an investment contract. Since the second of 
those cases, the traditional test for an investment contract has 
been known as the Howey test;" it has consistently been applied 
in state and federal court  decision^.^^ The Court restricted the 
scope of that test in the present case, however, by limiting the 
definition of profits. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that 
although the Court restricted the scope of Howey, it a t  the same 
time reaffirmed the validity of the Howey test for investment 
contracts. With that limitation and reaffirmation, the Court gave 
little, if any, satisfaction to critics of the test who have urged a 
- 
66. 95 S. Ct. at 2065-66. 
67. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U S .  202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959); 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344 (1943). 
68. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
69. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29, at 225. 
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br~ader interpretation of profits and an expanded application of 
the test.70 
Many have proposed that the Howey test should be ex- 
panded to include a "risk capital" factor,71 an approach adopted 
by California in Silver Hills Country Club v. So b i e ~ k i . ~ ~  The risk 
capital factor is present if the investor's funds are to be relied 
upon to provide a substantial portion of the initial capital needed 
to start the enterprise from which he expects some benefit.73 The 
respondents in the instant case urged the Court to enlarge the 
Howey test to include the "risk capital" approach.74 The Court, 
however, fully aware of the literature on the subject,75 specifically 
declined to adopt the risk capital approach in this case, thus 
casting some doubt on the approach's viability in the future.76 
Closely related to the risk capital approach is the "valuable 
benefit" concept.77 Stated simply, if the investor is led to expect 
some type of benefit, tangible or intangible, as a result of his 
investment, the transaction constitutes a security.7s The valuable 
benefit concept, urged upon the Court by commentators and the 
respondents in the present case as a useful enlargement on the 
profits factor in Howey, was adopted by the Second C i r c ~ i t . ~ q y  
narrowly defining profits, however, the Supreme Court excluded 
the flexible approach hoped for by those who would expand 
Howey and reaffirmed the necessity of the profit factor in the test 
as originally formulated. 
70. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful 
Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. R~v.367 (1967); See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29; 
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities 
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971); Long, Introduction to Symposium: Interpreting 
the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
96 (1974). 
71. See, e.g., id. 
72. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). 
73. State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 
549 (1971). 
74. Brief for Respondents a t  54. 
75. 95 S. Ct. a t  2063 n.23. 
76. The Court did not reject the risk captial approach; it merely declined ta  adopt it 
in the present case. "Even if we were inclined to adopt such a 'risk capital' approach we 
would not apply it in the present case." Id. 
77. Two commentators explain the relationship between the two theories in these 
terms: "[Tlhe valuable benefit concept and the risk capital theory are not separate and 
distinct; they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. " Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29, 
a t  245 (citation omitted & emphasis added). 
78. See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of 
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 164-65 (1971). 
79. 500 F.2d a t  1254. 
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B. The Literal Approach 
Under the literal approach, a court declares an instrument a 
security if on its face it appears to be one of those instruments or 
transactions defined as a security, regardless of the substance of 
the t ransac t i~n .~~ As noted above,81 three of the circuits rejected 
the literal approach by declaring that certain notes are not securi- 
ties even though the Securities Acts define securities as "any 
note. "" The Second Circuit, however, explicitly adopted the lit- 
eral approach in relation to shares in a cooperative housing corpo- 
ration. Applying the rationale that substance, not form, should 
govern, the Supreme Court settled this conflict in the instant case 
by rejecting the literal approach.S3 In all prior decisions, the 
substance-over-form approach was used to expand the coverage 
of the Securities Acts?' The present case constitutes the first 
Supreme Court decision to limit the scope of the Acts by examin- 
ing the substance of the transaction. This unique application of 
the substance-over-form approach is noteworthy in that it dem- 
onstrates the restrictive nature of the Court's decision. 
On public policy grounds, the Court's refusal to follow the 
literal approach and thus bring cooperative housing develop- 
ments within the scope of federal securities regulation is correct. 
If the Court had construed the Securities Acts to include coopera- 
tives, those developments would be subjected to the burdensome 
registration requirements of the Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission. Arguably, a developer would forego construction alto- 
gether rather than comply with those requirements. More likely, 
the developer would adopt a form of development, such as con- 
dominiums, that generally do not fall within the scope of the 
Securities Acts? At the very least, if the developer opted to take 
advantage of state and federal incentives to construct coopera- 
tives, the costs of compliance with securities regulations would 
necessarily be passed on to residents of the cooperatives. Regula- 
tion, by generating these consequences, would thus frustrate the 
public policy underlying state and federal legislative enactments: 
cooperatives to provide housing for middle- and lower-income 
families are needed and should be encouraged? 
80. Id. at 1252. 
81. See text accompanying note 52 supra. 
82. See note 28 supra. 
83. 95 S. Ct. at 2058. 
84. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
85. See notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text infra. 
86. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra. 
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C. Regulation of Cooperative Housing Corporation 
1. Excluding cooperative housing ventures from securities 
regulation 
By refusing to bring shares of nonprofit cooperative housing 
corporations within the ambit of federal securities regulation, the 
Court avoided creating an unequal status before the law between 
cooperatives and condominiums. The end result of both forms of 
real estate development are essentially the same although the 
mode of ownership in each case is much different.87 In the most 
common type of housing cooperative, a corporation must be cre- 
ated in which the tenant-shareholders buy stock and thereby 
effectively "own" their apartments. Condominium developers, on 
the other hand, sell individual apartments in fee simple. If the 
literal approach were applied, the stock of a cooperative corpora- 
tion would be a security but the evidence of fee simple title to a 
condominium would not. If securities questions are raised by the 
sale of condominiums, it is not because of the form of the transac- 
tion but rather because the sale in substance constitutes a secu- 
r i t ~ . ~ ~  
2. Subjecting cooperative housing ventures to securities 
regulation 
The Court's rationale in the instant case does not mean that 
the Securities Acts in all cases do not reach cooperative housing 
corporations. The Court merely ruled that the "profits" claimed 
by the respondents from the lease of Co-op City's commercial 
facilities were too "speculative and insubstantial" to bring the 
transaction within the scope of those Acts.89 A cooperative, how- 
ever, could be created where the profits were not so "speculative 
and insubstantial." For example, a large building could be con- 
structed in an urban area with only a few residential apartments 
in the upper floors and the rest of the building leased for commer- 
cial use. Such a building could easily take the form of a coopera- 
tive corporation where almost all of the cost to the residents is 
met by the rental income from the commercial users. 
A difficult task in future cases will be, therefore, to deter- 
mine a t  what point the profits of a cooperative become suffi- 
ciently substantial to render the cooperative housing transcation 
a security. The Internal Revenue Code offers a possible guideline 
87. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 775. 
88. See generally 1A ROHAN & RESKIN $ 4  18.01-.06 (1975). 
89. 95 S. Ct. at 2062. 
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for making that determination. Section 216 of the Code requires 
that 80 percent or more of a cooperative's gross income be derived 
from tenant-shareholders in order for the cooperative to qualify 
for a tax deduction.go Courts might be persuaded that if a cooper- 
ative corporation receives more than 20 percent of its gross in- 
come from sources other than the tenant-shareholders, such in- 
come is not "speculative and insubstantial." That "excessive" 
income would render the cooperative housing transaction an in- 
vestment contract subject to federal securities regulation. 
Shares in a cooperative housing corporation could also be 
classified as securities if the corporation did not have a right of 
first refusal as to its outstanding shares? The absence of such a 
right would enable the tenant-shareholders to sell their shares to 
the highest bidder. In a cooperative the size of Co-op City that 
has a waiting list several years long,92 a thriving market could 
emerge. It is not a t  all unlikely that speculators would begin 
buying cooperative shares with the hope of profits. Were that to 
happen, the shares would clearly be securities and the coopera- 
tive would have to comply with the requirements of the Securities 
Acts. 
The Court, in holding that shares of a nonprofit cooperative 
housing corporation are not securities, has left the regulation of 
such cooperatives to real estate development laws and state blue 
sky laws. It has not, however, closed the door of federal regulation 
on schemes that have the form of a cooperative housing corpora- 
tion but the substance of an investment contract. 
90. See note 17 supra. 
91. See 2 ROHAN & RESKIN a t  § 2.01[4][fl (1974); Whitebook, The Cooperative 
Apartment, 9 PRAC. LAW. April 1963, a t  25, 29. 
92. 366 F .  Supp. a t  1123 n.24. 
